Sentinel Research

In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, U.S. Transportation Command’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) would be responsible for transporting 90% of the Army and Marine Corps’ equipment into theater. But readiness levels have dropped to just 59%. Aging vessels, insufficient mariner availability, and systemic underinvestment mean the U.S. could lose 1–2 million square feet of sealift capacity annually—and those ships won’t be easily replaced.

Wartime plans assume that maritime logistics routes will be contested. That means not only will we have fewer ships and fewer qualified mariners—but that the ones we have will likely come under direct attack.

Rolander calls for urgent recapitalization of the sealift fleet, renewed investment in U.S. shipbuilding capacity, improved mariner recruitment and retention, and the activation of robust theater-level training exercises.

Without action, the U.S. risks losing not because it cannot fight, but because it cannot sustain the fight.

This paper examines the positioning of counterintelligence (CI) as a supported J3 fires function rather than an organic J2 supporting intelligence function. According to the DoD, counterintelligence includes ‘All activities to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including military or naval intelligence.’ Traditionally, CI is viewed as an intelligence discipline as it has been classified under J2, but primarily because its activities are more supportive in nature. It plays only secondary roles to other disciplines in the intelligence function. Nonetheless, because of the proactive nature of CI activities and given its dynamic pursuits, it may be better positioned under J3 as a fires function where it can have direct operational support in combat and strategic environments. This operational realignment allows CI to operate offensively and defensively in multiple domains, utilizing several different disciplines that include cyber operations, security, open-source intelligence (OSINT), special operations, and other foreign intelligence disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to outline the strategic benefits of this repositioning and to provide a case for how the integration of these diverse disciplines can successfully contribute towards CI goals as identified by the DoD. The potential of increased operational effectiveness and strategic advantage of aligning CI as a fires function will be examined. This paper will provide an analysis of the rationale for the shift by citing real-world case studies from the US Army and other military services.

The U.S. Marine Corps is undergoing a transformative restructuring through its Force Design 2030 initiative, aimed at enhancing operational agility, lethality, and strategic relevance in an era of renewed great-power competition. By prioritizing expeditionary warfare and developing Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), the Corps is adapting to the demands of high-intensity conflict, particularly in the Indo-Pacific theater. This transformation includes divesting legacy systems, investing in advanced technologies, and embracing distributed operations through small, mobile, and hard-to-detect units. These shifts signal a return to the Corps’ traditional amphibious roots while positioning it as a rapid-reaction force capable of projecting power in contested multi-domain environments. Through innovation in force structure and concept development, the Marine Corps is ensuring its continued effectiveness in deterring and defeating peer adversaries.

As warfare evolves, the U.S. Army must adapt to remain relevant in future conflicts—particularly in the maritime domain of the Western Pacific. This article argues that the Army should draw unconventional lessons from Yemen’s Houthi militants, who have successfully employed long-range precision fires and low-cost drones to deny sea control in the Red Sea. By leveraging existing programs such as Strategic Mid-Range Fires (SMRF), Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF), and DARPA drone initiatives, and by applying concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), the Army can project power from dispersed island positions and contribute meaningfully to maritime campaigns. Integrating these capabilities with strategic mobility and joint allied operations offers the potential for transformative deterrence and warfighting effectiveness.